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INTRODUCTION 
 
The intention of this short paper is to consider the current proposals of the European 
Commission to formalise and facilitate private party actions for damages in the field 
of EC competition law. This suggested Americanisation of competition law 
enforcement arguably goes against the aims and objectives of European Community 
Competition policy. In excess of 90% of all antitrust actions in the United States are 
now by way of private party enforcement but it is contended that the specific policy 
objectives of the European Union are better addressed through a strict model of 
effective public enforcement. 
 
On the 19
th of December 2005 the European Commission published a Green Paper on 
Damages actions for breaches of the European Community Competition Rules.
2 This 
follows the recent modernisation package that has been fully applicable since 1 May 
2004. The Green Paper focuses on developing the opportunities for private party 
actions for damages in E.C. competition law. Historically the right of enforcement of 
E.C. competition law has been seen as the responsibility of the European Commission 
which was conferred with its enforcement powers in 1962.
3 However it is suggested 
that the right of private party action probably derives from the judgment of the 
European Court of Justice in Van Gend en Loos
4 in the following year. The first overt 
suggestion from the ECJ of such a right came in 1993 in an opinion of Advocate 
General Van Gerven in the Banks case.
5 However, it is with its judgment in Courage
6 
                                                 
1 This is a working draft and should not be quoted or cited without the authors prior permission 
2 http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/actions_for_damages/gp_en.pdf  
3 Council Regulation Number 17 of 1962 
4 Case 26/62 NV Algemene Transporten Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos.v. Nederlandse 
Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1  
5 Opinion of Advocate General Van Gerven of 27 October 1993 in Case C-128/92 H.J.Banks & Co Ltd 
v. British Coal Corporation [1994] ECR I-1209 
  1that the Court of Justice firmly put its views on private enforcement forward. Here the 
Court stated that  
              “…actions for damages before the national courts can make a significant                                 
              contribution to the maintenance of effective competition within the              
              Community.”
7    
 
The recent modernisation package which came into force in 2004 also exhibits a 
belief that private party actions are envisaged.
8 However in the absence of any 
substantive Community rules in the area it was unlikely that effective actions could be 
maintained. While there has been a long history of private parties using EC 
Competition rules in defensive mode,
9 it is unlikely that private party actions for 
damages would occur without some active prompting from the Commission. There 
have been suggestions that threats of private actions have been used to induce 
settlements between various private parties but there is no definitive research in the 
area to back up this suggestion. It is in this context that the Commission published its 
Green Paper. Following a consultation period that ended in April 2006,
10 the 
Commission is awaiting an opinion from the European Parliament before an 
anticipated White Paper publication by the end of the year. While the Green Paper 
identifies various problems and provides various options it is contended that any 
proactive action on the part of the Commission will inevitably be less than 
satisfactory and will take the Commission on a road away from its stated policy aims 
and objectives. 
 
It is my contention that the Commission by actively encouraging and facilitating 
private party actions is obviating its responsibilities as the primary enforcer of E.C. 
competition law and policy.
11 In recent years the Commission has been keen to point 
out that the defence of the consumer is its primary objective,
12  yet it is arguable that 
it is direct enforcement by the Commission that is most effective in securing 
consumer rights. 
 
Many commentators have seen the Green Paper as a shift towards an American style 
approach to antitrust enforcement but it is contended that such a similarity in antitrust 
enforcement neglects the different policy objectives that were envisaged and intended 
on either side of the Atlantic. It has been argued that private enforcement of the 
antitrust laws of the United States vindicates the same substantive goals as public 
                                                                                                                                            
6 Case C-453/99 Courage v. Crehan [2001] ECR I-6314. The Court has recently reemphasised the 
importance of effective judicial remedies in private party actions in Case C-295/04 Manfredi .v Lloyd 
Adriatico Assicurazioni [2006] ECR I-0000 
7 Para 27 
8 Council Regulation Number 1 of 2003. Recital 7 states “National courts have an essential part to play 
in applying the Community competition rules. When deciding disputes between private individuals, 
they protect the substantive rights under Community law, for example by awarding damages to the 
victims of infringements.” 
9 See Case 127/73 BRT v. SABAM [1974] ECR 51 
10 The Commission received approximately 150 comments, the majority of which are available at: 
EU/Competition - Antitrust/Comments on the Green paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC 
antitrust rules
11 For a detailed consideration of this point see: Dan Wilsher “The Public Aspects of Private 
Enforcement of E.C. Law: Some Constitutional and Administrative Challenges of a Damages Culture” 
3 CompLRev 27 (2006) 
12 see for example any of the recent speeches by Commissioner Neelie Kroes at 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/speeches/index_speeches_by_the_commissioner.html  
  2enforcement.
13 However, it is my contention that the substantive goals of E.C. 
competition law vary significantly from those identified in the United States and the 
distinctive policy objectives inherent in E.C. competition policy require a distinctly 
European approach to enforcement. It is this divergence in policy objectives that gives 
rise to the question of whether differing policy objectives can be met with similar 
enforcement methods. Commissioner Kroes has stated that the current proposals at 
E.C. level are not a ‘cut and paste’ job viz US enforcement mechanisms yet one gets 
the impression that the lady doth protest too much.
14
 
There is also a view expressed that academics and lawyers have spent much time 
considering substantive antitrust issues while ignoring issues relating to enforcement 
doctrine.
15
  
 
A SHIFT IN POLICY? 
 
At the outset it is important to consider the objectives and goals of competition law 
enforcement. Strong arguments have been made that private enforcement is 
complimentary to public enforcement but many believe that a move to private 
enforcement goes against the objectives of EC competition policy.
16 It should 
obviously act as a deterrent to those who would engage in anti competitive behaviour 
and allow also for the compensation of those who have suffered loss as a consequence 
of such behaviour. Whether or not the current approach to enforcement is having an 
effective dissuasive impact is open to debate. It can be argued that the current high 
level of cartel decisions is evidence of an epidemic of price fixing amongst the 
oligopolies of Europe. However, I would suggest that the current spate of decisions 
against cartels is in fact evidence of the effectiveness of the Commissions Leniency 
Policy.
17 It should be noted that cartel investigations take a number of years to run 
their course and it is only in the past year that we have begun to see the fruits of more 
vigorous public enforcement. If anything, the reporting of these recent decisions and 
the imposition of record levels of fines is arguably going to have a serious dissuasive 
effect on those undertakings that would consider engaging in anticompetitive 
practices. There is also considerable evidence that the mere threat of antitrust 
enforcement may deter anticompetitive action in markets beyond that which is being 
                                                 
13 Joseph F. Brodley, “Antitrust Standing in Private Merger Cases: Reconciling Private Incentives and 
Public Enforcement Goals” 94 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1995) 
14 See comments by Commissioner Kroes at “Competition Law and its surroundings – links and new 
trends” Competition Day, Vienna, 19 June 2006 at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/382&format=HTML&aged=0&
language=EN&guiLanguage=en More recently in Brussels the Commissioner has spoken about the 
need for the private enforcement solutions ‘to be firmly bedded into European culture and tradition’ 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/07/128&format=HTML&aged=0&
language=EN&guiLanguage=en  
15 See Richard M. Buxbaum, “Public Participation in the Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws”, 59 
California Law Review 1113 (1971) 
16 In support of the complimentary benefits of private enforcement, see Assimakis P. Komninos, 
“Public and Private Antitrust Enforcement in Europe: Complement? Overlap?” 3 CompLRev 5 (2006). 
For a strong defence of the superiority of public enforcement see Wouter PJ Wils “Should Private 
Antitrust Enforcement be encouraged in Europe” (2003) 26 World Competition 567   
17 Commission Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases, (2006/C 298/11) 
at  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/c_298/c_29820061208en00170022.pdf  
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18 Critics of the current fines based approach
19 argue that while such 
fines may act as a deterrent they do not assist in compensating the victims of anti 
competitive agreements. However it is likely that consumers, the real victims of such 
practices, will be unable to recover damages in any effective manner under the new 
proposals. The plight of indirect purchasers from a cartel will not improve under a 
private enforcement regime. 
 
The rationale behind private party actions is that it is an obvious follow on from 
developed concepts such as direct effect and state liability. It is contended that full 
effect can only be given to E.C. competition law if private parties have direct rights of 
action against offending undertakings. Yet this argument can be undermined by 
recalling that although citizens of the European Union may bring Member States to 
court for failing to give effect to Community law, it is still the Commission that has 
the primary responsibility in this area.
20 Furthermore, it is increasingly obvious that 
the monetary penalties available to the Commission to ensure proper application of 
Community law are having the desired effect.
21 When the Commission brings 
proceedings against an undertaking it does so from a neutral standpoint. One cannot 
underestimate the significance of the diverging motives behind private and public 
enforcement; private profit as opposed to public policy. The Commission can also 
apply competition law against undertakings engaged in anticompetitive behaviour 
where no particular damage has been caused or loss suffered.
22 It has been argued that 
the Commission is limited in its action by the resources at its disposal, but equally, 
Member States have the ability to increase those resources if they see the benefits of 
effective competition law enforcement. 
 
 
 
WHY PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT IS NOT A SOLUTION 
 
Any rational undertaking that is contemplating anti competitive behaviour will weigh 
up the potential gains against the possible sanctions. If the sanctions fall short of the 
gains in economic terms then the attraction in engaging in such activity is obvious.
23  
Such an undertaking would be well advised that for a variety of reasons it is unlikely 
that it will suffer loss in damages equivalent to the gains accrued through its anti 
competitive behaviour. 
 
Inertia 
 
                                                 
18 See Jonathan B. Baker “The Case for Antitrust Enforcement” 17 Journal of Economic Perspectives 
4,27 (2003) 
19 The Commission may impose a fine of up to 10% of the undertakings previous years aggregate 
world wide turnover. The largest fine so far imposed was €497 million against Microsoft in 2004. The 
decision is currently the subject of an appeal at the Court of First Instance. In 2007 the Commission has 
already imposed fines totalling in excess of €2 billion on members of various cartels. See European 
Commission Cartel Statistics at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf  
20 Art 226 EC 
21 Art 228 EC, see in particular Case C-304/02 Commission .v France [2005] ECR I-6263 
22 It should be recalled that Article 81 EC refers to agreements, decisions and concerted practices that 
have as their object or effect, the distortion of competition in the Common Market. 
23 see Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law (2
nd ed. 2001) 
  4There is a strong likelihood that an undertaking engaged in anti competitive action 
will only face action from a certain number of customers and therefore not face 
serious economic loss. Potential plaintiffs face barriers such as access to evidence, 
legal costs and a fear of taking action against a supplier with whom it is likely to be 
engaging in future dealings. In particular, rules on disclosure vary greatly between the 
twenty seven Member States and harmonisation of such rules may prove difficult at 
best. The investigative powers of the European Commission have recently been 
strengthened and it is the Commission with its neutral stand point and strengthened 
resources that is best placed to initiate proceedings. 
 
Passing On Defence 
 
It is likely that any private party action for damages will be met with a passing on 
defence. While such a defence has been roundly rejected in antitrust cases in the 
United States
24 it is likely that such a defence may find favour in some European 
courts. If a passing on defence were to succeed it may be difficult for an indirect 
purchaser to successfully claim damages as it has been suggested that a plaintiff in a 
private party action will have to meet the criteria of a direct causal link as established 
previously by the Court of Justice with regard to state liability.
25 The failure of 
indirect purchasers to succeed in an action against a cartelist or monopolist obviates 
the suggestion that the motivation of the Commission in its proposals is consumer 
centred.  
 
 
 
 
Leniency 
 
Much of the success of public enforcement at EC level in recent years has been based 
on the successful operation of the Commission’s Leniency Notice.
26 The operation of 
the leniency and immunity programme is the persuasive counterbalance to the 
dissuasive effect of fines. There is a very real fear that undertakings may be well 
advised to steer clear of the leniency programme if the benefit of gaining immunity 
from fines is offset by handing over evidence that may lead to future actions for 
damages. Undertakings may well take a strategic decision not to come forward with 
evidence regarding a cartel and some of the submissions received on foot of the Green 
Paper show marked differences in opinion as to the damages that a cartel member 
should be liable for following a grant of leniency.
27 The road taken by the European 
Commission in its forthcoming White Paper will have major consequences for firms 
in deciding whether or not to come forward under the current leniency programme. It 
is my contention that its proposal on private actions for damages may lead to the 
ruination of its own policy on cartels. 
 
                                                 
24 Hanover Shoe Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. 392 U.S. 481 (1968) & Illinois Brick Co. v. 
Illinois 431 U.S. 720 (1970) 
25 Norbert Reich, “The ‘Courage’ Doctrine: Encouraging or Discouraging Compensation for Antitrust 
Injuries?” 42 CML Rev., 35 at 46. 
26 See note 16 above 
27 The various submissions received on foot of the Green Paper can be accessed at 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/actions_for_damages/gp_contributions.html   
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Lack of Consumer Actions 
 
Consumers who have suffered loss are highly unlikely to take individual actions 
against undertakings engaged in anti competitive behaviour. A brewing cartel that 
adds 5 cent to the price of a pint of beer in the E.U. may derive a monopoly profit of 
hundreds of millions of Euro in a year, but a consumer who drinks 10 pints a week is 
unlikely to commence proceedings for the recovery of €25! Furthermore, it is 
submitted that those potential consumers who were priced out of the market by the 
cartel and suffered loss by being unable to purchase the goods in question are an 
unidentifiable group. It is precisely this lack of consumer actions that highlights the 
paucity of benefits that will arise from a shift towards private party enforcement.  
 
 
 
 DEFENDING THE CONSUMER 
 
It should be recalled that the aims and objectives of the European Union are many and 
that no one policy has pre-eminence over another. Thus while Article 3 of the EC 
Treaty refers to ‘a system ensuring that competition in the internal market is not 
distorted’,
28 it also refers to ‘a contribution to the strengthening of consumer 
protection’.
29 The goal of consumer protection along with all other Treaty objectives 
must therefore be given consideration by the European Commission, the Court of 
Justice and national courts when enforcing and applying EC competition law. This is 
where we may observe a sharp delineation between the objectives of the antitrust laws 
of the United States and the competition policy of the European Union. 
 
As stated earlier, it is unlikely that consumers will benefit in any way from a move 
towards private party actions. If the Commission really believes its own message that 
competition policy is about defending the interests of consumers then it is argued that 
it would do well to maintain its current system of enforcement. It is patently obvious 
that consumers are unlikely to have the motivation, and perhaps not the standing, to 
maintain a private party action. In the earlier example of a beer cartel the product 
remains the same throughout the various stages of distribution from brewery to 
distributor to bar to customer. Contrast this with a product such as citric acid. Are we 
to believe that a price cartel in citric acid would have consumers rushing to the 
courthouse steps? Whereas a direct purchaser of citric acid such as a soft drinks 
producer, a detergent manufacturer or a food producer might succeed in an action 
against the cartel, the indirect purchaser, or consumer, will have little chance of being 
able to quantify the loss suffered as they consumer their coca-cola and wash their 
glass with Persil automatic !   
 
Proponents of private enforcement will argue that consumers will derive the benefits 
of direct purchasers succeeding in actions for damages as any award of damages will 
be passed on to consumers in the form of price reductions. This is perhaps somewhat 
                                                 
28 Article 3(1)(g) EC 
29 Article 3(1)(t) EC  
  6fanciful as such direct purchasers are more likely to show loyalty to a board of 
directors and shareholders than to a disparate group of consumers. 
 
It is submitted that the current fines based system is as likely to bring trickle down 
benefits to consumers as private actions by direct purchasers.
30 The Commission 
regularly points out that fines are paid into the Community budget thereby reducing 
the contributions of Member States. This in turn reduces the tax burden on citizens.
31 
This may seem somewhat fanciful in a world ever more cynical of government and 
politics, but is it any more fanciful than suggesting that large supermarket chains or 
food producers will pass on the proceeds of damages actions to its customers? 
 
It may be contended that the imposition of fines does not have a significant deterrent 
effect on would be cartelists and monopolists. While it must be acknowledged that the 
rational cartelist or monopolist may weigh up the potential profits as against the 
probable fines for a breach of EC competition law, one must also note that the 
Commission is entitled to factor into the calculation of the fine, any additional amount 
that would make good the illegal gain made by the undertaking.
32 If the Commission 
is of the view that the maximum fine is not sufficient to meet the loss suffered at the 
hands of the cartelist or monopolist there is nothing to prevent it seeking an 
amendment to Regulation 1/2003 and getting the maximum level of sanction increase 
above the current 10% ceiling. Furthermore, an undertaking must consider the 
possibility that a successful investigation against it by the European Commission may 
lead to the same evidence being used against it in the United States given the high 
level of cooperation now found between the two jurisdictions.  
 
Another argument often put forward by proponents of private enforcement is that 
public authorities do not have sufficient resources to effectively pursue all infringers 
of competition law. This argument ignores the fact that studies continually show that 
the proceeds of effective antitrust enforcement far outweigh the costs of such 
enforcement.
33 The greater the resources invested in enforcement by the Commission, 
the greater the proceeds in terms of fines will be. We must also acknowledge that the 
policy of fair and effective competition between undertakings in the European Union 
is as important to the public interest as to require public enforcement rather than 
private litigation.
34
 
                                                 
30 For an overview of the rules on the imposition of fines in EC competition law see: Guidelines on the 
method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No. 1/2003 (2006/C 210/02) 
at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/c_210/c_21020060901en00020005.pdf  See also 
Joined Cases C-100 to 103/80 SA Musique Diffusion francaise and others .v Commission of the 
European Communities [1983] ECR 1825  
31 See Competition: Commission Action against Cartels – Questions and Answers, at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/05/454&format=HTML&aged=0&la
nguage=en&guiLanguage=en  
32 Provided that the maximum limit of 10% of the undertakings previous year’s aggregate turnover is 
not breached. 
33 See Jonathan B. Baker “The Case for Antitrust Enforcement” 17 Journal of Economic Perspectives 
4,27 (2003)  
 
34 Indeed, such an argument has been made in the past in relation to effective enforcement in the United 
States. See Wendell Berge, “Some Problems in the Enforcement of the Antitrust laws” 38 MICH. L. 
REV. 462 (1940) 
  7Furthermore, it is regularly suggested that by allowing a scheme for private 
enforcement, the Commission is ensuring that it can target its resources at the most 
heinous of cartelists. It is suggested by analogy with United States antitrust 
enforcement that this leads to greater efficiency in the field of enforcement.  This 
argument fails however on the ground that in the United States the sanctions arising 
from public enforcement are criminal in nature and as such are only pursued in the 
most extreme of cases. The use of the de minimis rule at EC level allied to the use of 
national competition authorities through the modernisation process that came into 
force in 2004 should allow the Commission to target its resources most effectively at 
serious infringers.  
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Despite the protestations of DG Competition it is clear from the discourse surrounding 
the Green Paper that the direction of the proposals is towards Americanisation of the 
antitrust process. This, despite many criticisms within the United States of its current 
enforcement regime.
35 Indeed, it has been pointed out that although the U.S. 
authorities have proposed a concurrence of procedures in antitrust enforcement, they 
have not proposed uniform rules on private enforcement.
36
  
Speaking in Brussels in March 2007, Commissioner Kroes indicated that the 
proposals on private enforcement were about protecting ‘customers and consumers,    
the small businesses and individual citizens who foot the bill of illegal behaviour’.
37
Yet, it is precisely these groups who are least likely to benefit in the rush to private 
enforcement. A rush to see private enforcement of competition law as a panacea for 
all anticompetitive ills is unlikely to benefit European consumers. Rather, vigorous 
enforcement of the existing rules by DG Competition is far more likely to yield results 
through use of the leniency procedure and heavy fines. Further reforms of DG 
Competition’s own procedures may also assist in ensuring effective public 
enforcement. The OECD has recently suggested an explicit separation between the 
investigative and decision making functions of the Commission.
38 This suggestion is 
to be welcomed but has obvious resource and structural implications for the 
Commission. Any proposals to change the rules governing the enforcement of the 
Community competition rules requires the agreement of the Council of Ministers, 
something which has not always been forthcoming in the past.
39 With a White Paper 
due at the end of 2007 it is obvious that the debate on the issue is far from concluded. 
                                                 
35 See in particular Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law (2
nd ed. 2001) Chapter 10 
36 Joel Davidow, ‘International Implications of US antitrust in the George W Bush era’ (2002) 25 
World Competition 493, 496.  
37 Speech by Commissioner Kroes “Reinforcing the fight against cartels and developing private 
antitrust damages actions: two tools for a more competitive Europe” Commission/IBA Joint 
Conference on EC Competition Policy, Brussels, 8
th March 2007, at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/07/128&format=HTML&aged=0&
language=EN&guiLanguage=en  
38 ‘Competition Law and Policy in the European Union’ OECD (2005) at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/7/41/35908641.pdf  
39 It took fifteen years for the Council of Ministers to adopt the Merger regulation from the time it was 
first proposed in 1974. 
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their own national procedural rules will not be easily won. Rather, the Commission 
might be better advised to invest its time and resources into giving full effect to the 
existing policies and rules. The persuasive effect of leniency, the dissuasive effect of 
fines and more efficient public enforcement can all lead to an effective policy that 
supports competition and protects consumers.    
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